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ABSTRACT 
We complement the rich conceptual work on organizational corruption by 
quantitatively modeling the spread of corruption within organizations. We systematically 
vary four organizational culture-related parameters, i.e., organization structure, location of 
bad apple, employees’ propensity to become corrupted (“corruption probability”), and 
number of whistle-blowers. Our simulation studies find that in organizations with flatter 
structures, corruption permeates the organization at a lower threshold value of corruption 
probability compared to those with taller structures. However, the final proportion of 
corrupted individuals is higher in the latter as compared to the former. Also, we find that for a 
1,000-strong organization, 5% of the workforce is a critical threshold in terms of the number 
of whistle-blowers needed to constrain the spread of corruption, and if this number is around 
25%, the corruption contagion is negligible. Implications of our results are discussed. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years there has been a spate of work on organizational corruption in general, 
and on the organizational contagion processes that result in corruption getting normalized or 
institutionalized in particular (Ashforth & Anand 2003; Brief, Buttram, & Dukerich, 2001; 
Darley 2005; Moore 2009; Pinto, Leana, & Pil, 2008). Although this work has identified a 
variety of mechanisms through which corruption could spread across an organization, 
quantitative studies of these dynamics and their consequences have been relatively neglected. 
In parallel, there has been a wealth of quantitative studies about diffusion in general and 
contagion in particular (Dodds & Watts 2005) which have investigated the spread of, inter 
alia, fads and fashions (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1992; Hirsh 1972), unpopular 
norms (Bicchieri & Fukui, 1999), rumors (Nekovee, Moreno, Bianconi, & Marsili, 2006), 
sentiment contagion (Zhao et al. 2014), management practices (Abrahamson & Fairchild 
1999), organizational forms (Lee & Pennings 2002), and civil service procedures (Tolbert & 
Zucker 1983), among others. These studies have been conducted across a variety of units and 
levels of analyses, e.g., individuals (Bikhchandani et al. 1992; Hirsh 1972), organizations 
(Abrahamson & Fairchild 1999), industry (Lee & Pennings 2002), cities across a State 
(Tolbert & Zucker 1983), and States of a country (Goel & Nelson 2007). However, intra-
organizational contagion has been relatively neglected. 
Our paper is at the intersection of corruption and contagion literature streams because 
we quantitatively model corruption contagion within organizations.  Although there has been 
substantial conceptual and qualitative exposition of the social contagion processes that result 
in organizations becoming corrupt, there has been almost no quantitative work on this subject 
(see Chang & Lai 2002 for an exception). For instance, Pinto et al. (2008: 688) conceptualize 
an organization of corrupt individuals as one that results when personally corrupt behaviors 
cross a critical threshold but they do not precisely specify this level or point at which the 
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phenomenon escalates from the individual-level to the organization-level. They follow 
Andersson and Pearson (1999) who suggest that when the number of incivility spirals reach a 
critical threshold it may result in “uncivil” organization, again without quantifying the 
threshold or tipping point. 
We bridge this gap by quantitatively modeling the dynamics of corruption  spreading in 
organizations to investigate the following questions: What is the critical threshold in terms of 
corruption probability (i.e., employees’ propensity to be corrupted) which, once crossed, will 
result in the entire organization being corrupted?; What are the evolution or contagion 
dynamics of corruption from a single bad apple to an organization-wide phenomenon?; What 
proportion of the organization should be potential whistle-blowers to prevent it from being 
corrupted?  The model we have developed is general and is applicable to any organizational 
structure but as a first step, we investigate its dynamics on purely hierarchical organizational 
networks, considering both tall and flat structures. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we develop a stochastic 
model for corruption dynamics in organizations.  In Section III we perform extensive Monte 
Carlo simulations of our model on a set of purely hierarchical organizational networks, and 
describe the results of the corruption spreading dynamics, i.e., the corruption threshold, the 
impact of organizational hierarchy, and the impact of whistle-blowers on the corruption 
spreading. We conclude this paper in Section IV with a discussion of the implications of our 
findings for future theorizing and practice. 
 
II. MODELLING CORRUPTION CONTAGION 
II.1   Phenomenology 
Contagion is defined as the spreading of an entity or influence between individuals in a 
population via direct or indirect contact (Dodds & Watts 2005) and social contagion 
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(Goldstone & Janssen, 2005: 427) is defined as “the spread of an entity or influence between 
individuals in a population via interactions between agents. Examples are the spreading of 
fads, rumors, and riots.” In this paper we focus on one form of social contagion; the spread of 
a corrupt practice. Corruption is generally defined as the misuse of a position of authority for 
private or personal benefit (Shleifer & Vishny 1993).  
One of our key objectives is to derive a point-estimate of the “critical threshold” 
(Andersson & Pearson 1999; Pinto et al. 2008), or “tipping point” (Gladwell 2000), which 
when breached results in the corrupt practices effectively pervading the entire organization. 
Identifying the critical threshold is important because once corruption pervades an 
organization, the organization will almost certainly decay and die, resulting in enormous 
social and economic costs. We bound our paper around the definition of organization of 
corrupt individuals (Pinto et al. 2008: 688), which is “an emergent, bottom-up phenomenon 
in which one or more mesoscale processes facilitate the contagion (and sometimes the 
initiation as well) of personally corrupt behaviors that cross a critical threshold such that the 
organization can be characterized as corrupt.”  
For corrupt practices to diffuse widely within an organization, the organizational 
culture would necessarily be complicit. We therefore include four key organizational-culture 
related parameters in our simulation studies. Our modeling parameters include organization 
structure, bad apples, individuals’ propensity to be corrupted, and whistle-blowers. 
Organization structure: Corruption could permeate both through proximity, and aspects 
like interdependent relationships and mentoring programs both vertically and horizontally. 
With regard to vertical corruption contagion, Bovasso (1996) found that individual adoption 
of attitudes and behaviors is influenced by those who have power over them, and this could 
result in crimes of obedience (Hamilton & Sanders 1999). With regard to horizontal 
corruption, Greve (1995: 450) states that “in a decentralized organization with many 
Modelling intra-organizational corruption contagion  
 
5 
 
decision-making nodes, horizontal contact among decision makers within the organization is 
likely and can lead to contagion of practices within the organization.” Both forms of 
contagion could co-exist and reinforce each other. Jones and Kavanagh (1996) found that 
when authority figures and peers both exert an influence towards corrupt behavior, their 
effect is amplified. However, it is not clear from the literature whether corrupt practices 
would permeate taller organizations faster, and to a greater extent, than flatter organizations, 
or if it would be vice versa. To attempt to address this issue we model corruption contagion 
with regard to both taller structures and flatter structures. 
Location of “bad apple”: In the bad apples perspective on corruption, individual 
characteristics are assumed to be the primary force influencing unethical behavior (Brass et 
al. 1998; Felps et al. 2006; Gino et al. 2009; Moore 2009; Trevino & Youngblood 1990). 
Further, Bettenhausen and Murnighan (1985) found that when norms are not immediately 
apparent, individuals tend to transpose norms from past experience in similar situations. This 
notion resonates with management research that utilizes modeling techniques. Puranam and 
Swamy (2010: 4) state, “do not assume that the agents always commence from a state of 
agnosticism about the true state of affairs. Instead of a tabula rasa, interacting agents often 
bring with them their own mental models of the situation (Rouse & Morris 1986).” Thus, a 
new recruit who has been engaging in corrupt practices in his or her previous organization 
may transpose them into the current organization and thereby become a bad apple.  
According to Greve (1995), a theoretical interest pioneered by network studies is that 
the location of actors in a social structure leads to heterogeneity in contagion (Burt 1987; 
Galaskiewicz & Burt 1991; Marsden & Friedkin 1993; Strang & Tuma 1993). For instance, 
centrality in the information structure is associated with greater likelihood of contagion 
(Coleman et al. 1966). In a branching network (i.e., organization structure) it is obvious that 
the higher the bad apple is located in the hierarchy, the greater the likelihood, speed, and 
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pervasiveness of corruption throughout the organization. However, the differential impact of 
the bad apple being at various levels of the hierarchy is not clear, especially across 
organizations of differing heights/breadths. Hence, we model the time evolution of corruption 
that emanates from a single bad apple varying the hierarchical level at which it is located. 
Propensity to become corrupted (or “corruption probability”): In order for corruption 
to spread in an organization the presence of bad apples is necessary but not sufficient. It is 
also required that the rest of the organization must be influenceable and adopt the corrupt 
practice. Following research in personality psychology, we take the view that individuals 
differ in their propensity to be influenced. One of the key personality constructs that has 
influenceability at its core is self-monitoring. Self-monitoring is the extent to which a person 
observes their own expressive behavior and adapts it to the demands of the situation 
(Gangestad & Snyder 2000). According to Pinto et al. (2008: 691), “high self-monitors have 
more variability in attitudes and behavior, pay more attention to others’ expectations, and 
have lower commitment (Day, Schliecher, Unckless, & Hiller, 2002) and they are more likely 
to engage in unethical behavior (Ross & Robertson 2000).” We model employees’ propensity 
to become corrupted as a probability (“corruption probability”). 
Number of whistle-blowers: Although diffusion and contagion studies usually focus on 
the take-up and spreading, rather than on the inhibition and dropping-off (Strang & Macy 
2001), in this paper we also include an inhibitory factor, i.e., whistle-blowing. Whistle-
blowing is an important antidote to corporate corruption (Boyle 1990; Paul & Townsend 
1996). Near and Miceli define whistleblowing as “the disclosure by organization members 
(former or current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate organizational acts or omissions to 
parties who can take action to correct the wrongdoing” (1985: 4). Thus, if an employee who 
is a whistle-blower becomes aware that a corrupt practice is being engaged in, he or she 
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would blow the whistle and the contagion would be arrested. We do not specify whether the 
whistle is blown anonymously or not (Nayir & Herzig, 2011). 
II.2 Mathematical Model  
We follow the standard assumption in all mathematical models of contagion that the 
infection probability is independent and identical across successive contacts (Dodds & Watts 
2005). Thus, we have developed an independent interaction Poisson model rather than a 
threshold model, which asserts that an individual can only become infected when a certain 
critical number of exposures has been exceeded, at which point infection becomes highly 
probable (Dodds & Watts 2005). Our modeling methodology has two components: (1) a 
model for the underlying organizational contact network along which the contagion spreads; 
and, (2) a mathematical formulation of the phenomenology of corruption spreading. In the 
following each of these components are described.  
The model described below is adapted from the rumor-spreading work by Nekovee et 
al. (2006) and is an attempt to formalize and simplify the behavioral mechanisms in terms of 
a set of simple but plausible rules. In formal rumor-spreading models (Daley & Kendal 1965; 
Maki 1973; Nekovee et al. 2006), a closed population is subdivided into three groups; those 
who are ignorant of the rumor (“ignorants”), those who have heard it and actively spread it 
(“spreaders”), and those who have heard the rumor but have ceased to spread it (“stiflers”). 
Early work on modeling rumor spreading (Daley & Kendal 1965; Maki 1973) assumed a 
homogeneously mixed population.  This approximation is appropriate when the population is 
relatively small such that one can assume that each individual can directly contact every other 
individual in the population, i.e. the underlying contact network is well-approximated by a 
fully connected network where every individual can contact every other individual in the 
population. Nekovee et al. (2006) extend the model to the case where contacts can take place 
along the links of a social network with an arbitrary connectivity structure. We adapt the 
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model by Nekovee et al (2006) in the following manner, i.e., the spreading of corruption in an 
organizationally bounded population of individuals. 
Model of corruption spreading  
We consider a population of individuals within an organization, e.g. a firm or 
corporation. The population is subdivided into two groups; those who are ignorant of the 
corrupt practice (“innocents”), and those who are engaging in the corrupt behavior 
(“corruptors”) and attempt to spread it. The corrupt behavior permeates through the 
organization by directed contacts of the corrupted with the innocents. We assume that the 
contacts take place via the organizational contact network. We also assume that there are 
already some corrupt individuals, following previous work (e.g., Blanchard, Krueger, & 
Krueger, 2005) showing that corruption rarely emerges out of nothing, but it is usually related 
to some already corrupt individuals or environment which may “infect” the susceptibles.  
In our model, the susceptibles or innocents, as we term them, may become corruption-
aware by direct interaction with corruptors. On becoming corruption-aware, the innocents 
could respond in one of three ways: (1) get infected (i.e., they adopt the corrupt practice as 
well), and thus become “corruptors”,  (i.e., they actively attempt  to spread the corruption to 
other innocents through direct interaction); or, (2) do not get infected, and are termed 
“uprights” because though no longer innocent (i.e., they are aware of the corrupt practice), 
they do not adopt the corrupt practice; or, (3) blow the whistle, and are termed “whistle-
blowers”, who on becoming corruption-aware report the wrongdoing to the authorities who 
effectively stop the corrupt practice. We note that whistle-blowing is a feature which is not 
present in the rumour spreading model of Nekovee et al (2006). Another difference is that in 
the model of Nekovee et al (2006) an infected node may become a “stifler” and stop 
spreading the rumor after being contacted by another infected node, a feature which cannot 
be rationalized in the context of corruption spreading.  
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The whistle-blowing process in reality is never this simple (Vandekerchkove & Lewis, 
2011) or this effective (e.g., Near & Miceli 1996), and would depend on numerous situational 
factors (Robinson et al. 2011). We are making this simplifying assumption for the purposes 
of our modeling. We assume that upon the reporting of a corrupt individual by a whistle-
blower, the corrupt individual is immediately removed from the organization and replaced by 
an upright member. This approach also resonates with the business ethics literature. For 
instance, Zyglidopoulos and Fleming (2007) also parse individuals into innocents (bystanders 
and participants), corrupted (active rationalizers and guilty perpetrators), and whistle-
blowers. 
Our mathematical formulation of the dynamics of the above model is as follows. At 
each timestep, members of an organization could be in one of the following four behavioral 
states: innocent, corruptor, upright, or whistleblower. An innocent is an individual who is 
unaware of the corruption practice, whereas a corruptor is an individual who practices the 
corrupt behavior and attempts to spread it to other members of the organization. An upright is 
an innocent individual which has been the subject of an unsuccessful attempt by a corruptor 
but has not adopted the corruption practice, a whistleblower is a node which upon being 
contacted by a corruptor cause the corruptor to be removed from the organization and 
replaced by an innocent. The contacts between the corrupted and the rest of the organization 
are governed by the following set of rules: (1) a corruptor contacts, i.e., attempts to influence 
an innocent, at  each timestep ; (2) whenever a corruptor contacts an innocent, the innocent 
could become corrupted with probability  (3) if, after contacting an innocent, the innocent 
does not become a corruptor, the corruptor may become spontaneously innocent with 
probability  if a corruptor contact a whistleblower it will be removed with probability 
one from the organization and replaced by an innocent member due to the above-mentioned 
whistle-blowing process.  
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In the above, the first rule models the tendency of corrupt individuals to justify their 
behavior by influencing others to do likewise. The second rule models the tendency of 
individuals to adopt a corrupt practice, particularly if it is in their personal interest. The third 
and fourth rules indirectly model the ethical culture of an organization. If the ethical culture 
of the organization is strong then the probability of a corruptor infecting the innocents should 
reduce with every failure to infect an innocent, and the corruptor should either realize that the 
ethical behavior is the best course, at least while he or she works for that organization, or is 
removed from the organizational by the whistle-blowing process 
Model of organizational network 
Gulati and Puranam (2009) distinguish between the formal organization (i.e., the 
normative social system designed by managers) and the informal organization (i.e., the 
emergent pattern of social interactions within organizations), both of which simultaneously 
co-exist and jointly affect organizational performance. In this paper we have assumed that 
contacts only take place along the links of the formal organization, i.e., organization 
structure. 
Our model for the organizational network currently takes as its point of departure the 
simplest version of organizational networks: a pure hierarchical organizational tree with 
branching ratio k and L levels of organizational hierarchy. The number of nodes (agents) in 
this network is given by )1/()1(  kkN L . Furthermore, the average degree of the network 
is obtained from 
1
)1( 1
2

 

L
L
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k
kk  
We note here that the above model of organizational network does not incorporate the 
informal social connections between members which may exist across the hierarchy.  Indeed, 
the formal hierarchical network may be considered as a well-defined backbone on top of 
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which an overlay social network could be superimposed using, for example, the network 
construction algorithms described in Dodds et al. (2003).  However, unlike the organizational 
hierarchy which is very well defined, it is rather difficult to map out the overlay social 
network among the members, and different choices may result in hugely different network 
structures. For this reason, we will limit ourselves in the current study to investigating 
corruption dynamics taking place along the formal organization network. Consequently, by 
choosing different values for the parameters k  and L  we are able to model a range of 
organizational network structures,  from “flatter” (corresponding to choosing small values of  
L  and large values of k ) to “taller” (corresponding to choosing small values of  L  and large 
values of k ). 
III. SIMULATION STUDIES 
We performed Monte Carlo simulation studies of the afore-mentioned model on three 
synthetically generated organizational networks which were characterized by (k=3, L=7), 
(k=4, L=6) and (k=10, L=4). These networks were chosen such that the total number in the 
organization for all was roughly the same (i.e., around 1000) as well as having very similar 
average degree ( 2k ), but with the network structure becoming less hierarchical and more 
flat as L was decreased and k was increased at the same time. In each simulation we assume 
that corruption starts from a single corrupted individual and then spreads in the organization 
due to direct contacts between corruptors and innocent members. Since the dynamics of 
corruption are stochastic, each such corruption spreading event was repeated over 100 Monte 
Carlo runs in order to obtain meaningful statistical averages. Furthermore, corruption would 
spread differently depending on the position of the initial corruptor node in the organization, 
and the results were also averaged over events starting from 10 different randomly chosen 
initial corruptor nodes. 
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In addition, in order to analyze the impact of the position of the initial corruptor in the 
organization on the spreading, we also performed an additional set of simulations where we 
specified the “rank”, 𝑙, of the initial corruptor (i.e., a node at the top of the organizational 
hierarchy has rank 𝑙 = 1, while a node at the bottom of the hierarchy has rank 𝑙 = 𝐿 ). 
All simulations were performed until the number of corrupt individuals became 
stabilized around a stationary mean. At each timestep of the simulation each corrupt 
individual attempts to corrupt all other innocent individuals to whom it is connected via an 
organizational link. If the corrupted individual is successful in such an encounter, then the 
innocent individual becomes corrupted at that timestep and will attempt to spread the 
corruption from the next timestep. On the other hand, if the corrupted individual is 
unsuccessful in its attempt, it may become innocent with probability  at the next timestep. 
Finally, if a corrupt individual attempts to corrupt a whistle-blower then it will be removed at 
that timestep and replaced by an innocent in the next timestep. 
 
III.1 Critical Corruption threshold 
In the first study we model corruption contagion across three organization structures 
that vary with regard to how tall or flat they are. We fix the value of delta equal to 1 and 
investigate how varying the corruption probability  impacts the final proportion of corrupted 
individuals. We note that in our model delta is the probability that a corruptor becomes 
innocent after an unsuccessful attempt to turn an innocent individual into a corrupt 
individual.3 
                                                 
3 We note that even with delta set to one there is a clear difference between this 
mechanism and the whistle-blowing mechanism in the model since if a corrupt individual 
contacts a whistle-blower it is immediately replaced by an innocent. On the other hand, it the 
corrupt individual contacts an innocent it will only turn into innocent if its attempt of 
corrupting the individual is unsuccessful.   
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In Figure 1 we show how the final proportion of corrupted individuals in each 
organization changes as the corruption probability increases. As can been seen from Figure 1, 
as  is gradually increased from zero towards one there is a transition from the state in which 
corrupt behavior dies out due to unsuccessful contact with innocent nodes and is unable to 
permeate the organization. However, above this threshold the corruption is able to spread in a 
significant proportion of the organization, with the final number of corrupted individuals 
increasing as corruption probability increases. This result indicates that  
our model has a critical corruption threshold below which corrupt behavior dies and above 
which it is able to spread to a significant proportion of the population. We have verified 
numerically that the threshold is approached with zero slope, i.e. the transition to the corrupt 
state happens smoothly.   
 
Figure 1 The final fraction of the corrupted individuals as a function of corruption 
probability is shown for three organizational structures. 
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We have found that the value of the critical corruption threshold depends on the 
topology of the underlying organizational network along which corruption spreads, i.e., the 
organization structure. In particular, as can be seen from Figure 1, the threshold is lowest 
(around   = 0.32) for the flattest organization structure (k=10, L=4) and increases with 
increasing organization hierarchy to around  =0.38 for the moderately tall structure (k=4, 
L=6), and around  = 0.42 for the tallest structure (k=3, L=7).  This result suggests that 
organizations with a flat hierarchy, such as professional service firms may be more 
susceptible to organizational corruption than organizations with taller structures, such as 
manufacturing firms. This finding seems to resonate with reality, going by the number of 
investment banking firms that have been indicted on corruption charges. 
However, once the corruption takes off, the final number of corrupted individuals does 
not seem to show a systematic dependence on network hierarchy, and this is an aspect that we 
can investigate in future research. Although the flattest structure has the lowest corruption 
contagion threshold, it spreads at a lower rate than in the other two taller structures and at the 
end of the simulation has resulted in the corruption of approximately 58% of the workforce, 
as compared to approximately 65% for the tallest structure, and approximately 78% for the 
moderately tall structure. This finding could be explained by the fact that flatter structures 
result in looser coupling (Reichman 1993) and “compartmental insulation” (Goffman 1970: 
78) and this acts as a barrier to the pervasion of the corrupt practice.  
That organizations with moderately tall structures can get corrupted to a greater extent 
than those with very flat or very tall structures is a counter-intuitive result (the intuition 
would be that it would be lower) which can be investigated in future research. 
 
III.2 Impact of “Bad Apple” location on corruption contagion 
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Next, we investigate how the location of the initial corruptor member in a tall 
organization structure (k=3, L=7) impacts the dynamics of spreading at two different 
corruption probabilities, =0.6 in Figure 2, and =0.5 in Figure 3. The figures depict the time 
evolution of the number of corrupted individuals.  Results are shown for scenarios when the 
initial corruptors are at different levels in the organizational hierarchy, with l=1 
corresponding to an individual at the top and l=7 corresponding to an individual at the bottom 
of the hierarchy.  
 
Figure 2  Time evolution of corruption spreading is shown for the tallest structure and 
corruption probability = 0.6. Results are shown for corruption starting from a 
bad apple located at different position in the organizational hierarchy, varying 
from 𝒍 = 𝟏 (top of organization) to 𝒍 = 𝟕 (bottom of the organization). 
In Figure 2, the value of is set at 0.6, which is much higher than the corruption 
probability threshold for this type of structure (i.e., around 0.42, from Figure 1). It seems that 
regardless of the location of the initial corruptor in the hierarchy, the corruption spreads rapidly 
through the organization and results in a large proportion of the organization’s workforce 
getting corrupted. It can be seen from Figure 2 that the position of the initial corruptor in the 
organizational hierarchy can greatly impact the spreading of corruption. Specifically, we see 
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that, as expected, corruption grows slower and “infects” a much smaller proportion of the 
organization when it starts from the bottom. However, for this particular value of , it appears 
that the differences between spread of corruption when the initial corruptor is at various levels 
of the hierarchy (apart from the lowest levels, l=6,7), is not very marked. We note that due to 
the hierarchical structure of our networks the majority of the nodes belong to the lowest levels, 
e.g. in the above network 727 nodes out of a total of N=1039 nodes are located at l=7.  
Therefore, the final fraction of corrupted individuals as shown in Figure 1, which is obtained 
by averaging over results obtained by starting the corruption from 10 randomly chosen 
individuals in the networks, is always dominated by the results for l=7 and l=6. Thus, the results 
in Figure 2 are consistent with the corrected Figure 1.  This observation also holds for the 
results shown below in Figures 3 and 4. 
 
Figure 3 Time evolution of corruption spreading is shown for the tallest structure and 
corruption probability = 0.5. Results are shown for corruption starting from a 
bad apple located at different position in the organizational hierarchy, varying to 
𝒍 = 𝟏 (top of organization) to 𝒍 = 𝟕 (bottom of the organization). 
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In Figure 3, the value of is set at 0.5, i.e., closer to the corruption threshold (0.42) and 
the impact of the position of the initial corruptor on the dynamics is much more pronounced 
than that for =0.6 scenario. Firstly, as would be expected, a much smaller proportion of the 
organization’s workforce is eventually corrupted in all seven conditions. However, despite 
this lower range compared to the =0.6 scenario, the differences between the seven 
conditions are much more marked. Taken together, Figures 2 and 3, suggest that in tall 
organization structures, a bad apple at any hierarchical level other than the bottom-most will 
result in widespread corruption contagion regardless of the corruption probability of 
individual employees. Further, a reduction of 0.10 in the corruption probability results in a 
halving of the overall pervasion of the corruption contagion. This implies that in taller 
structures, e.g. manufacturing firms, recruitment and selection should not only focus strongly 
on hiring high-integrity individuals, but also take special care in this regard when hiring 
employees at levels other than the lowest level.  
In order to compare the differential impact of hierarchy, we conduct a similar 
simulation study to Figure 2 but for the flattest rather than the tallest organization structure. 
In Figure 4, results are shown for the flattest structure (i.e., k=10, L=4) with =0.6.  
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Figure 4 Time evolution of corruption contagion and for different choices of the 
position of the initial corrupted member (bad apple) in organizational hierarchy is 
shown for the flatter structure and corruption probability fixed at =0.6. 
 
Once again, it can be seen that moving the initial corruptor from the bottom of the 
hierarchy to higher levels results in a very pronounced increase in both the speed of spreading 
and the final number of corrupted nodes. However, there is marked difference between the 
spread of corruption when the initial corruptor is at the lowest hierarchical level as compared 
to the higher three levels.  
Comparing the spread of corruption for =0.6 between the tallest structure (Figure 2), 
and the flattest structure (Figure 4) we can see that in the latter case, the corruption does not 
permeate the organization to the same extent as in the former case. This reinforces our 
conclusion from Figure 1 that corruption spreads more slowly in flatter structures as 
compared to taller structures.  
 
III.3 Impact of Whistle-blowers on Corruption Contagion 
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The impact of whistle-blowers on preventing widespread corruption in organizations is 
investigated via simulations performed for the network corresponding to (k=4, L=6), i.e., the 
moderately tall organization structure.  For this study we randomly designate a proportion p 
of the individuals as whistle-blower and then simulate the resulting corruption dynamics 
following the same Monte Carlo method as described before.  Figure 5 shows how increasing 
the proportion of whistle-blowers, at levels of 1%, 5%, 10% and 20% of the organization’s 
workforce, impacts the final proportion of corrupted individuals.  
 
 
Figure 5 Impact the fraction of whistle-blower on onset of corruption contagion 
threshold is shown for the moderately tall network (corresponding to k=4, L=6). 
 
It can be seen that if the proportion of whistle-blowers is less than 5% then the impact 
of whistle-blowing is insignificant. However, once the number of whistle-blowers is 
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increased above 5% the presence of such individuals could prevent widespread corruption 
altogether by shifting the value of the corruption threshold upwards.  
In Figure 6 results are shown for the final proportion of corrupted individuals as a 
function of p, and with the corruption probability fixed at =0.6.   
 
Figure 6: Impact of the fraction of whistle-blowers on the final number of corrupted 
individuals is shown. for the moderately tall network (corresponding to k=4, L=6).  
 
Increasing the proportion of whistle-blowers initially results in a gradual decrease in the 
final size of corruption. However, it can be seen that there is phase transition (tipping) at 
around p=0.25, i.e., when a quarter of the organization members are whistle-blowers, above 
which we see a dramatic decrease in the final size of corruption. This is an interesting result 
as it indicates that there is a critical value for the proportion of whistle-blowers in the 
organization above which the action of such individuals can prevent widespread corruption. 
 
III.4 Implications for practice.  
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Firstly, it seems that when corruption probability is high, then regardless of the type of 
organization structure, the corruption will permeate the entire organization. This underscores 
the importance of testing prior to selection. In terms of selection testing, researchers have 
found that unethical behaviors can be predicted both from specific integrity or honesty tests 
(Bernardin & Cooke 1993; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Schmidt, 1993) and from general 
personality instruments (Lee, Ashton, & de Vries, 2005). This is even more important for 
organizations with flatter structures, such as professional service organizations (e.g., lawyers, 
accountants, consultants, investment bankers), because the corruption probability threshold 
for these organizations is lower than it is for organizations with taller structures. 
Unfortunately, real-life evidence suggests that professional service organizations may not be 
cognizant of this risk, and their focus on business objectives rather than on their professional 
code of conduct could increase their likelihood of being corrupted to above the critical 
threshold, with disastrous consequences. The obvious examples in this regard are the 
investment banking firms (e.g., Lehman Brothers) in which relentless focus on short-term 
business results and bonuses resulted in corruption permeating the entire organization and 
eventually resulted in their demise. 
Secondly, the hierarchical level at which the bad apples are located has significant 
impact on the corruption spreading dynamics. As one would expect, the higher the level at 
which the bad apples are located, the faster and wider the spread of corruption in the 
organization. However, if the organization is able to hire employees who are less likely to 
succumb to corrupt influences, then the differential impact of hierarchical level is even more 
pronounced, i.e., junior-level bad apples have a much lower impact on corruption spreading 
dynamics than senior-level bad apples. This implies that the testing of senior-level job 
applicants with regard to ethics should be conducted more rigorously than for junior-level job 
applicants. However, once again it seems that in real-life the opposite is true, and junior-level 
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positions (e.g., sales staff in retail organizations, or tellers in consumer banking) are subjected 
to greater scrutiny on ethics than senior-level positions (e.g., sales managers, bank branch 
managers). Also, the socialization processes for junior employees (e.g., management trainees) 
is usually far more formal, rigorous and comprehensive than for senior employees. Therefore, 
if a senior employee is carrying a “corruption virus” with him or her, the lack of a rigorous 
socialization process will allow the virus to be retained and it could initiate a corruption 
contagion in the future. 
Thirdly, the presence of potential whistle-blowers is an important antidote to corruption 
spreading. Even if 5% of the workforce are potential whistle-blowers then the chances of the 
corruption being inhibited are very high, and if this number can be raised to around 25%, then 
the impact of bad apples on corruption spreading will be negligible. Thus, our simulations 
provide some indication of what would be a reasonable target to achieve in terms of fostering 
whistle-blowers in an organization. The lower bound, i.e., 5% is not an impossibly tall order 
for an organization to shoot for and if organizations create a climate conducive to whistle-
blowing then at least the lower bound could be achieved.  
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IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our paper bridges two important research streams, organizational corruption and social 
contagion. With regard to organizational corruption research, we complement the rich 
existing conceptual work by formally modeling corruption contagion. We have quantitatively 
depicted the time-evolution of corruption across organizations with different organization 
structures and estimated the critical thresholds at which the corruption would irrevocably 
contaminate the organization and the proportion of whistle-blowers needed to inhibit the 
spread of corruption. As mentioned earlier, this is one of the few attempts to study the role of 
organization structure in influencing ethical actions. Our paper also contributes to the 
literature on social contagion, by modeling intra-organizational contagion across individuals, 
an area that has been relatively neglected. Further, we are not aware of other social contagion 
studies that have included a parameter that impedes the contagion, such as the potential 
whistle-blowers in our study. 
One of the benefits of formal modeling is unanticipated implications (Adner et al. 
2009), and we plan to further investigate some of the intriguing results in this paper, in 
particular, the impact of taller versus flatter structures on corruption spreading dynamics. 
Also, in organizations there are power differentials among individuals in a dyad, and power 
asymmetry would influence the corruption probability. This means that it would be easier for 
a superior to influence a subordinate to adopt a corrupt practice, than it would be for a 
subordinate to influence a superior, or even a peer. In terms of our simulation studies, this 
implies that rather than have a fixed corruption probability we could have a range of 
corruption probabilities which reflect power asymmetries.  
Our paper is generative in terms of future research. For instance, now that we have a 
ball-park estimate of the critical threshold of “corruption probability” of individuals, we 
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could conduct studies using threshold models rather than Poisson models. The base-rate 
“corruption probability” of individuals itself could be estimated and triangulated through 
laboratory experiments. This lab base rate could then be adjusted to account for the effect of 
factors like the organization’s climate for ethics (Dickson, Smith, Grojean, & Ehrhart, 2001) 
or ethical work climate (Victor & Cullen 1988).  
In this paper, we have varied the corruption probability and considered the evolution of 
the corruption contagion emanating from a single bad apple. In future work, we could keep 
the corruption probability fixed at a low value, and vary the number of bad apples, who could 
be randomly distributed through the organization to investigate the contagion dynamics. This 
approach would reflect the situation wherein although the majority of the employees are high 
in integrity, there are some bad apples who should have been rejected but have been hired. 
Considering the interesting results with regard to organization structure, i.e., that the 
compartmentalization emanating from flatter structures results in slower spreading and lower 
overall contamination, we could model contagion across other underlying network structures. 
For instance, core-periphery structures, which are characterized by a dense, cohesive core and 
a sparse, unconnected periphery (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf 1997; Borgatti & Everrett 1999), 
are not only considered representative of organization structure (where the top management 
team is the core, and the rest of the organization is the periphery) but also rife in structural 
holes, and modeling corruption contagion over this network structure might prove insightful. 
We could also consider the impact of power asymmetries and other situational factors 
on the effectiveness of whistle-blowing. Combining the results of our simulations, since 
corruption contagion is more inimical at senior levels, and presence of a small number of 
whistle-blowers is an effective antidote, we could explore the impact of varying the 
hierarchical level location of the whistle-blowers in future research, instead of simply taking 
a random sample as we have done here. 
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